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The “Fight for Peace” in the Airwaves – Tito,
“the Chained Dog of Imperialists”
Irén Simándi
The radio broadcasts from countries involved in the Cold War had a major role in pro-
moting relevant propaganda. Of course, this applied to the Hungarian Radio Corpora-
tion as well. In this study, with an analysis of the documents of the Hungarian Radio,
we will present a segment of the foreign language radio programs broadcast between 1949
and 1951; the years of the campaign against Yugoslavia, and personally against Josip
Broz Tito, the Yugoslav party leader, who turned against Stalin. The character of foreign
languages broadcasts were subordinated to the political propaganda and followed well
ups and downs of the Cold War. In 1956, after the settlement of the Soviet-Yugoslav
conflict, disappeared not only the Cominform and so its newspaper against Yugoslavia
the “New Struggle”, but changed the tone against the West as well.
[Cold War; foreign language radio broadcasts; propaganda; Yugoslavia; Cominform]
The radio broadcasts from countries involved in the Cold War had a
major role in promoting relevant propaganda. Of course, this applied
to the Hungarian Radio Corporation as well.1 In this study, with an
analysis of the documents of the Hungarian Radio, we will present a
segment of the foreign language radio programs broadcast between 1949
and 1951; the years of the campaign against Yugoslavia, and person-
 Institutional Departments of International Relations and History, Kodolányi János
University of Applied Sciences, 8000 Székesfehérvár, Fürdo˝ u. 1., Székesfehérvár,
Hungary. E-mail: simandiiren@upcmail.hu.
1 TheHungarian Radio Corporation started its regular broadcast on 1. December 1925.
The first letter from Hungarians living abroad had already arrived at the Radio in
May 1926. About the history of the Hungarian Radio I wrote three monographs:
I. SIMÁNDI, Politika, társadalom, gazdaság a Magyar Rádióban 1945–1948, Budapest
2012; I. SIMÁNDI, Politika, társadalom, gazdaság a Magyar Rádióban 1949–1952, Buda-
pest 2014; I. SIMÁNDI, Politika, társadalom, gazdaság a Magyar Rádióban 1953–1956,
Budapest 2016.
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ally against Josip Broz Tito, the Yugoslav party leader, who turned
against Stalin.2
The documents of foreign broadcasts are only partially available in
the Archives of the Hungarian Radio Corporation: the records from
the period 1945–1948 are missing. Available are only the themes of
the broadcasted programs from 1952 – these were analogous to the
preceding years. However, in 1953, after the death of Stalin, changed
both the content and the tone of the broadcast programs to abroad -
especially in the case of Yugoslavia.
  
The last assembly of the Information Bureau of Communist and Workers’
Parties (the Cominform), was held in Hungary 1949. The aim of the
organisation founded in 1947 was to create Soviet structures in Eastern
Europe – under the leadership of Moscow. However, Tito was not
willing to take the role of the vassal and thus, Yugoslavia was expelled
from the organisation; Tito, the heroic partisan-leader was now the
agent of the imperialists, the “dog on chain”.3 The campaign started
immediately in the Hungarian Radio, as well.
Answers to the Questions of Mihály Farkas, Party Deputy General
Secretary
Károly Ráth, head of the Special Foreign Service (editorial of pro-
grammes in foreign languages, after 1950 the Shortwave Department),
made a report to Mihály Farkas, deputy of Mátyás Rákosi, party gen-
eral secretary and minister of defence, on 31. March 1949 who in a
previous letter had required an answer to three questions.
The first question was about how the programmes4 in the Serbo-
Croatian language support the formation of “organizations against
Tito”. According to the documents: “almost nothing has been done in
this area. In this regard, we did not receive any instructions from the Party”,
2 At this time Tito wrote to Stalin: “Stop sending people to kill me. We’ve already captured
five of them, one of them with a bomb and another with a rifle. [. . . ] If you don’t stop sending
killers, I’ll send one to Moscow, and I won’t have to send a second.” R. MEDVEDEV, The
Unknown Stalin, London 2003, pp. 61–62.
3 The most complete collection of the Cominform documents is only available in Rus-
sian: Sovewni Kominforma 1947, 1948, 1949. Dokumenti i materiali,
Moskva 1998, Milan 1994.
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wrote the head of the department. “We have no contact with our Yu-
goslav comrades, and do not know anything about their fights or particular
plans. The co-operation we had with comrade Brankov5 for a couple of weeks
did not make any difference, either. Comrade Brankov did not even men-
tion the need of such communication on radio.” According to the report,
the newspaper Nova Borba (New Battle)6 did not contain such infor-
mation, either. Similarly, neither the broadcast in Moscow “nor the
radio programmes from the people’s democracies give specific organizational
instruction to the Yugoslav comrades”.
Later, Brankov made spoke of “disguised” instructions. The Radio
however, did not get instructions from the MDP to implement this.
The leadership of the department proposed to insert the disguised or-
der into the “wadded instructions”.
The second question of Farkas was about the slogans to “encourage
our Yugoslav comrades to resist the Tito regime”. The answer was:
the department did not have anything like that, but Brankov had pro-
posed this “some months ago”. “To our best knowledge, he had it sent to
comrade Rákosi for approval. We have not received any instructions on this
issue yet. The broadcasts and the programs did not include anything that
would encourage to direct fight, resistance, organisation or sabotage against
Tito’s measures.” It was noted at the same time, that there are certain
programs, that “encourage constantly to fight [. . . ] though in a less tangi-
ble manner, but with formulations like ‘it is the obligation of every Yugoslav
worker to fight against Tito in order to lead Yugoslavia back to the camp of
democratic peoples’. Or: ‘it is the responsibility of Yugoslav communists
and workers to use all means and oppose the traitorous politics of the Tito
4 The Hungarian Radio Corporation started to broadcast in Serbo-Croatian on 30 Au-
gust 1938. From 7 September 1949, news were broadcasted in Slovenian, as well.
Report. 13 April 1950, Médiaszolgáltatás-támogató és Vagyonkezelo˝ Alap (hereafter
MTVA KI), Box TD-282/6. 2.
5 Lazar Brankov (1912–2011) Yugoslavian (Serbian) diplomat. From 1945 head of the
Yugoslav military mission assigned to the provisional Hungarian government, later
chargé d’affaires of the embassy in Budapest. After the decision on the exclusion
from the Cominform he was entrusted with the organization of the committee of
emigrants opposing Tito. 1949 he was sentenced to life imprisonment as second
defendant in the Rajk show-trial. He was released in April 1956 and emigrated to
Paris. Magyar Nagylexikon, Vol. 4, Budapest 1995, p. 495.
6 New Strugglewas a Serbo-Croatian weekly by Cominform by Yugoslav Communists
in exile. I. BANAC, With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Commu-
nism, Ithaca – London 1988, p. 224.
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clique’. Or: ‘socialism in Yugoslavia can only be built if Yugoslav workers
lead by the communists win over the traitorous anti-Semitic, anti-Leninist
and anti-Soviet politics of the Tito group’”. Such slogans emphasize the
obligation of Yugoslav communists, patriots and Yugoslav workers to
liberate Yugoslavia.
The third question of Mihály Farkas was about the “political” line of
the programs of the Special Foreign Service. According to the report,
“the broadcasts focus on uncovering”. They highlight the connections
between “the developments of the economic and political situation in
Yugoslavia and of the different measures and the treachery of the Tito
Clique. Our starting point is what problems there are current in the
people’s everyday life (food shortage, raw material shortages in the
factories, increase of rail tariffs etc.) and then we show that all this
is the direct consequence of the treachery of Tito. We highlight that
the five years’ plan and his other goals are unrealistic, serve only the
eccentricity of Tito and his group and do not contribute to building
socialism. We disclose facts Tito tries to hide from the people. (Arrests,
pacts with the imperialists, etc.)
The shortwave programmes presented letters sent from Yugoslavia
on problems “people in Yugoslavia discuss among themselves, but [. . . ] do
not dare to speak about openly (the indiscriminate behaviour of the authori-
ties, the indifference of the leaders for the concerns of the workers, etc.)”.
It was also reported that the programs broadcasted contained infor-
mation “to discriminate against the Tito clique (to present people the facts
on how leaders live today, that they possess everything while the workers live
in increasing poverty)”.
The programmes communicated the “position of communist parties
around the world on the politics of Tito. (Tito tried to convince people that
only ‘some’ communist leaders would attack them.)” Foreign programmes
broadcasted news Tito had “withheld from the people”. The pro-
grammes used “relevant articles on Yugoslavia from the imperialistic press
to prove that the imperialists do not consider Tito an enemy but an alliance
against the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies”.
The programmes quoted the “hypocritical, demagogue and untrue
phrases of the Tito group”, commented on Tito’s speeches and ex-
plained “the facts behind expressions like pro-soviet etc. and [. . . ] that
their own speeches and writings uncover their treachery, anti-Soviet and
anti-Marxist politics”.
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In celebrations and anniversaries, the programmes reminded “com-
munists and the working people of the heroic fights of the past” and empha-
sized that “the past obliges for the fight against the Tito-clique”.7
Mátyás Rákosi and the Radio Committee of the Hungarian Radio
Corporation
Sándor Barcs, chairman of the Radio committee of the Corporation,
presented a note on his meeting with Mátyás Rákosi, General Secre-
tary of the Hungarian Working People’s Party (MDP) on 5 May 1949.
“Comrade Rákosi exercised especially condemning critique on the Serbo-
-Croatian broadcasts.” Rákosi “ordered Sándor Barcs to provide appropriate
support to Károly Ráth, accountable manager of the foreign language news
broadcasts”.
According to the order, the Radio committee had to ask Károly Ráth,
to prepare a proposal in order to improve the standard of the pro-
grammes. The head of the foreign language broadcasts prepared the
proposal by May 11. In his view, the condemning remarks of Rákosi
were due to deficient programme-funding during the previous weeks
and that Brankov was not actively involved in “drawing up” the pro-
grammes “either as a consultant, or as a liaison person”. The proposal
of the “Yugoslav comrades” did not prove to be good tactics: “for the
radio, the ideological education of the Yugoslav comrades through the ether
is more important and more decisive than covering problems of daily politics,
therefore articles and presentations with an ideological nature domineered in
our programmes”.
Ráth underlined in his notes that the department continues to be-
lieve that “the discussion of daily issues and the fresh and instant response
to the developments is definitely better than over-ideologised programmes.
Unfortunately, our hearing with comrade Farkas came too late and we could
not clarify these questions. In any case, the six weeks without any direct con-
tact with a comrade responsible for the broadcast, brought significantly lower
interest for our programmes in Yugoslavia. According to the latest reports
of the Hungarian ambassador to Belgrade, the Serbo-Croatian programmes
have regained their previous strength after the programme-structure was re-
organized in line with the guidelines of comrade Farkas and comrade Rajk”.8
7 Report. 31 March 1949 documents of the Shortwave Department. MTVA KI. Box
No. 3.
8 László Rajk (1909–1949) was foreign minister at this time; he was arrested on 30th
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The topicality and the political importance of the Serbo-Croatian
programmes can be increased – he wrote – “if we contrast the results of
the Hungarian construction to the facts from Yugoslavia and make the Yu-
goslav people perceive through in their own daily life, what are the major
benefits of the friendly relations among people’s democracies and the attach-
ment to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the facts clearly show that Tito
joined the imperialists. We have rather little information on that”.
In his proposal, he suggests to fill the following gaps:
1. He emphasizes, that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should “in-
crease the frequency of the Belgrade-Budapest courier service, so that
we get information faster and more frequently about the events in Bel-
grade”. It would be also important that the “information from Yu-
goslavia is passed on to the radio without any bureaucratic delay” and
is not withheld by the “sea of bureaucracy”.
2. The party leadership should decide that “comrade Gábor Péter,
after an appropriate but fast selection, shall send us the Yugoslav infor-
mation we can use in our programmes (mainly on the living standard,
the production difficulties, shortages of goods, the disintegration pro-
gresses in the army and the police) so that we can include it in our
programmes, or rather, that we can build the programmes on such in-
formation”.
3. Further, also on the basis of information from the State Protec-
tion Authority, we would need – after appropriate control – “Yu-
goslav persons” who were granted “asylum” in Hungary and
who could tell about “their own experiences in Yugoslavia and
their own stories” into the microphone.
4. He underlined in his proposal the need of establishing a “con-
stant and well informed” connection with the party leadership.
“Therefore we need to receive the guidelines from our Party conse-
quently and without delay, [. . . ] so that we can make the necessary
changes immediately and appropriately, whenever needed, both in voice
and in approach.”
May 1949 and sentenced to death in a show trial. T. HAJDU, A Rajk-per háttere és
fázisaI, in: Társadalmi Szemle, 1992, 11, pp. 13–36.
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He also remarked in his notes that “apart from the often obsolete infor-
mation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we have not received relevant
information on Yugoslavia from any other bodies or institutions”. He was
convinced, that his recommendations, if implemented, will result in
“an important improvement in the programmes in Serbo-Croatian language
compared to their current quality”.9
New Leader at the Head of the Radio – István Szirmai
The parliamentary elections on 15 May 1949 brought substantial
changes in the life of Hungary. The political power of Mátyás Rákosi
was strengthened and the political legitimacy of the one-party system
was consolidated. There were also changes in the leadership of the
Hungarian Radio Corporation: by the instruction of Mátyás Rákosi,
István Szirmai got into the chair of the general director. The new gen-
eral director informed József Révai, Minister of Popular Culture on 29
August 1949 about his experiences in the Radio. Among them, about
the state of the foreign news service. In his evaluation he also men-
tioned that the Post promised to resolve the technical problems of the
shortwave broadcast by 1. October. The news service has to recruit
“cadres with appropriate language and writing skills”. Decision has
to be made on the department leader and the staff who speak foreign
languages well. The department often broadcasts “politically sensitive
materials. It has to take a position in major issues of international politics.
Therefore, party-line leadership, regular information and appropriate control
by the relevant stances are indispensable. These are still unresolved ques-
tions”.10
Béla Fenyo˝, another new leader, head of the Shortwave Department
of the Radio, prepared a plan (September 7, 1949) and underlined in
connection with the production of programmes in the Serbian and
the Slovenian languages: the editors shall prepare uncovering pro-
grammes on Yugoslavia that increase the audience’s indignation and
hatred for the Tito regime. “We want to have facts” in the commentaries
“that our listeners will later discuss in the market, in the fields, etc., facts that
move them,” he wrote.11
9 Note. 11 May 1949 MTVA KI. Documents of the Shortwave Department. Box No. 3.
10 To comrade József Révai. August 29, 1949 MTVA KI. TD-322/3.
11 Draft. September 7, 1949. MTVA KI. TD-282/6.
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One of the documents of the department, dated from 9 October
1949, contains the topics of the Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian pro-
grammes. It enlists the most important activities and the commen-
taries on the main political events that took place during the autumn.
A constant theme in the programmes was to “unveil the Tito-clique for
the peoples of Yugoslavia and to present the struggle of the working masses
and of the new Communist Party to remove Tito and his band, to liberate Yu-
goslavia and to return the country to the democratic camp lead by the Soviet
Union. The programmes have been militant and highly offensive, from their
beginning. On the one hand, we unveil these facts so that we force the Tito-
clique to deal with unpleasant questions or to take certain measures seriously;
and on the other, we try to be at the same time the informant, the inspirer and
– as much as it is possible through the radio – the organizer of the fight of the
people in Yugoslavia”.
In August and September, one of the main topics of the broadcasts
was the Rajk-trial. In the Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian broadcasts,
“we put on air both the indictment and the testimonies and quoted the most
important parts from the trial literally”. After the end of the trial, its
former broadcasts were repeated on the basis of the “Blue Book”, the
propaganda material of the trial and its main subjects were discussed
“thematically” in several broadcasts. We presented “articles from the
press of the socialist camp, first and foremost from the Soviet Union but also
from the capitalist press”. According to the document, members of the
Shortwave Department commented themselves the “indictment and
the testimonies”; they underlined that “the statements made in the testi-
monies drove Tito and his gang to the wall” and stressed the importance
of the trial. Not only its importance from the Hungarian and inter-
national perspective, but specifically from the angle of the Yugoslav
people.
In the broadcast of September 20, the editor considered it to be im-
portant to emphasize that the Rajk-trial “created a new situation for the
people of Yugoslavia in their fight against Tito and his gang. The Rajk-trial
has produced documentary evidence to the people of Yugoslavia, that those
who tore the country out of the camp of the Soviet Union and the people’s
democracies, those who plunged it into unprecedented misery and those who
sold off Yugoslavia to the imperialists – are the agents of American imperial-
ists”.
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After the end of the trial the programmes discussed how “it assists
the fight of the Yugoslavian people”. The conclusion of the trial was:
“Tito and his gang are not erring, they are not building a separate path to
socialism but have been enemies to socialism from the beginnings.” The trial
gives answer “to all who asked themselves: how is it possible that the lead-
ers of the partisan fights shamefully betrayed their country and the goals for
which the blood of the people of Yugoslavia flowed like water. [. . . ] The im-
portance of the Rajk-trial for Yugoslavia is not only that it gives answers and
explanations but also that it shows nakedly: who have the power today in Yu-
goslavia and what goals do they follow. The importance of the Rajk-trial for
Yugoslavia is the fact that it underlined from the perspective of the Yugoslav
and of global politics, how significant the just cause is that Yugoslav patri-
ots fight for under the leadership of the new Communist Party of Yugoslavia
against the Tito gang”.12
In the following years, the propaganda warfare against Tito and Yu-
goslavia did not lose momentum. A detailed report from April 13,
1950 described the time, the length and the content of the broadcasts
in great detail. The political nature of the broadcasts was determined
by the resolution of the Information Office, the articles of the newspaper
Tartós békéért, népi demokráciáért (For Constant Peace and People’s Democ-
racy) and the emigrant press, the commentaries broadcasted by the
Moscow radio and articles in connectionwith Yugoslavia from the Sza-
bad Nép (Free People). The head of the Shortwave Department said in
his evaluation on the work of the department that the articles and re-
views – prepared on the basis of the sources mentioned before, “were
very offensive. We are do not argue with Tito and his associates, but un-
veil that they are American spies, the agents of the American war-plans, who
sell off Yugoslavia and are the greatest enemies of the Yugoslav people. We
often point to their contradictory lies and their obvious tricks they tried to
cheat with the Yugoslav people and the world in a sarcastic tone. We often
have witty commentaries or brief spots to ridicule Tito and his band. [. . . ]
We have many speeches of the Titoist leaders recorded on tape, so we insert
some parts and replay in the commentaries and unmask them with their own
voices”.
In connection with the sources it was emphasized that: “speeches,
articles are aired several times [. . . ] in their complete form, often literally”.
12 9. October 1949 MTVA KI. Documents of the Shortwave Department. Box No. 3.
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In many cases, the articles were included in the commentaries in an
abbreviated form.
Whenever the Yugoslav press and radio broadcasts were used, the goal
was to reflect on “the events as soon as possible”. They presented
“the new measures to the listeners” and highlighted “the real mean-
ing of the speeches” but emphasized the importance of avoiding “any
explanation of their propaganda”; instead, efforts should be made to
present “the fascist nature etc. of the Tito system through specific (speeches,
measures etc.)”. The radio should only react to “speeches and mea-
sures” that are clearly interesting for the Yugoslav workers.
According to the document, articles from the Western press were
used to show “the connections between the Tito band and the imperialists
through accidental statements in the imperialistic press and to present Tito’s
role in the plans of the imperialists against the Soviet Union”. Articles on
the economic state of Yugoslavia, the treaties and the loans were also
often used. They read out such news in the programmes and then
asked if it was true. The answer could not be avoided.
Another source was the writings of “Yugoslav political emigrants liv-
ing in Hungary, especially of those working in the radio, about their personal
experiences in Yugoslavia. They wrote on the occasion of different anniver-
saries”. These commentaries “are often novelistic and appeal to the emo-
tions. It is quite common [. . . ] for them to compare the happy and wealthy
life here with the misery of the Yugoslav people”.
The reports from the Hungarian embassy in Belgrade were also
an important source for the programmes. “They were sent regularly
for some time, they were specific and an immense help to our work. Then
for months we received nothing. The situation improved a little in the last
months, though. Information on prices was especially important. It is a ma-
jor deficiency that the Hungarian embassy in Belgrade rarely gives us infor-
mation that could help to agitate against the sufferings and the sorrow of the
working people. In the commentaries on Yugoslavia we try to propagate the
new JuCP (Yugoslavian Communist Party) and quote directly articles from
the emigrant press or elsewhere or report on them when they deal with the
party. Unfortunately, these hardly articles contain specific facts, by the very
nature of things, to a certain extent.”
The articles and news on the “achievements of the Hungarian peo-
ple’s democracy” and of the “other people’s democracies” were also
used in the programmes as sources. “We often draw parallel between the
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Yugoslavian and the Hungarian situation in the so called profiling broad-
casts.” In this connection, we already highlighted the leading role and
the work of the MDP, emphasized specifically the role of the Soviet
Union and the Bolshevik Party and the support of comrade Stalin in
building people’s democracies and retaining their independence etc.
In his report, Béla Fenyo˝ also wrote about the importance of propa-
gating the Soviet Union. In the commentaries, they underline the lead-
ing role of the Soviet Union and especially, the decisive and “unswerv-
ing” love for Stalin and the Soviet Union. The programmes gave a
picture of the “high culture and the joyful life of the Soviet people”.
The details were illustrated with the Travel diary of the Hungarian
Stakhanovist, Imre Muszka.
“The battle for peace” assumed growing significance in the broad-
casts. It was discussed in the news and commentaries with a focus on
“the peacekeeping nature of the battle of the people of Yugoslavia”.
The head of the department wrote about the echo of the Serbian and
Slovenian broadcasts. “According to consistent information” the broad-
cast “is well listened to. The main reason to this is that the streaming of
the Kossuth Radio can be received excellently throughout Yugoslavia.” The
same can be said about Peto˝fi Radio, too.
“Until the February 1949, we received hundreds of letters, 30–40 a day.
In February 1949, Tito removed the possibility for our audience to write to us
from one day to the other. In the factories and organizations of the People’s
Front, the Titoist propaganda-machinery decided that workers shall promise
they will not listen to the broadcasts of the Budapest radio. The Yugoslav
press and the Titoist leaders regularly discuss the broadcasts of the Hungar-
ian radio in their speeches. In their satire magazines they do their utmost
to make the radio from Moscow and from other people’s democracies absurd
but they focus mainly on the Hungarian radio. The radio in Belgrade broad-
casts every Sunday a ‘radio cabaret’. They constantly deal with the radio in
Budapest. According to the Hungarian embassy in Belgrade, our radio has
many listeners. Yugoslav emigrants in Hungary confirm the same. We reg-
ularly send a copy of our broadcasts to the Nova Borba. Comrades there say,
that the broadcasts are good.”
After enumerating the results the editorial achieved, Fenyo˝ also
wrote in his report about the deficiencies. Agitation is “not focused
enough”. Co-workers of the editorial are not always persistent in the
“continued elaboration” of the most important topics. The knowledge
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of “important materials” is often incomplete. They do not use well
“the facts set out in the Yugoslavian and international media”. He
pointed out on a negative note, that the commentaries are “not deep
enough, they do not reach back to previous statements andmeasures”.
Also, the columnists are too late to “react to important events”, the
“commentaries” are therefore “often not specific enough, they tend to be
insufficiently specific or too general. In particular the quality leaves some-
thing to be desired”.
In his proposal he underlined that “the Serbian section in the depart-
ment for foreign language broadcasts in the Budapest radio needs a leading
cadre who can strengthen the section and give guidance on how to inter-
pret the articles in the Titoist and emigrant newspapers”. The “emigrants
currently working at the department do not have an appropriately advanced
thinking or vision and their perspective is not broad enough. Some of them
do not even have the talents for radio-propaganda. There are serious miss-
matches in their behaviour and in their relation to the others. The quality
of the work done by the Hungarian staff in the section is not high enough,
either”.
Questions of Mátyás Rákosi, Secretary General of the Party
The letter dated May 3, 1950 suggests a strict party leadership over
the Radio. It contained twelve questions by Mátyás Rákosi, quasi
suggestions for the technology and the content of the broadcasts of
the Serbian-Slovenian section.13 Two days later, May 5, Szirmai re-
sponded in a 7-page report and sent it to the secretariat of Rákosi.14
The document shows the importance attached to the foreign language
editorial and the Serbian-Slovenian broadcasts against the back-
ground of the international events.
The fourth question in the letter of Rákosi was about the Comin-
form decisions related to the Yugoslav propaganda.15 Szirmai wrote
in his response: “The basis of our articles and commentaries is the decision
of the TI.16 In connection with the Yugoslavian events, we always rely on the
considerations laid down by the TI.”17
13 To comrade István Szirmai, Budapest. May 3, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.
14 Report. May 5, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.
15 To comrade István Szirmai, Budapest. May 3, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.
16 TI, Information Office, Cominform.
17 Report. May 5, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.
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The fifth question of Rákosi was about the unveiling of the “Tito
clique” and the agents of the “American imperialists – the warmon-
gers”.18 While acknowledging the importance of the question, Szirmai
replied: “This is at present the central element of our broadcasts. In connec-
tion with the creation of the Athens-Belgrade axis we can point out that Tito
and his clique are indeed the main agents of the American imperialists that
the imperialistic America wants to set up an anti-Soviet base in Yugoslavia
and use the People of Yugoslavia as cannon-fodder. From time to time, we
return the discussion on why Tito is keeping one million men in arms.”19
The sixth question was about the Yugoslavian election propagan-
da.20 Before the election 1950, the Serbian programmes broadcasted
all “relevant materials they could use from the emigrant press. The central
motto [. . . ] was: No vote for the Tito fascists”. The commentaries dealt
with “different groups of working people” and drew their attention
to the “anti-grassroot policy of the Tito band” from the perspective of
their own situation. Short statements of the Yugoslavian emigrants’
were also included in the programmes. They presented the individ-
ual “Titoist election candidates” as supporters of the “old reactionary
parties” or as members of “Tito’s gang of spies”, the “bourgeois” who
had no connection with the “working people”.
The programmes underlined that “the people of Yugoslavia should re-
spond to the election-comedy with an increased fight against Tito and his
gang. Many critical articles and sarcastic commentaries” told listeners
about “the lies and the contradictions in the campaign speeches of Tito and
his gang”.
After the elections, the main topic was “the hatred the people of Yu-
goslavia felt for the fascist system. The people of Yugoslavia do not recognize
the ‘parliament’ and raise the war flag higher”.21
The seventh question was about the “difficult financial situation of Yu-
goslav workers, about the collapse of the economy, the crimes of the Gestapo-
type of state apparatus and about the terror”, further about “how opera-
tional is the radio and how fast does it react to the Yugoslav internal political
events”.22 Szirmai wrote in his answer: “Only the emigrant press and
18 To comrade István Szirmai, Budapest. May 3, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.
19 Report. May 5, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.
20 To comrade István Szirmai, Budapest. May 3, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.
21 Report. May 5, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.
22 To comrade István Szirmai, Budapest. May 3, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.
157
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
West Bohemian Historical Review VII j 2017 j 1
sometimes newspapers of communist parties” provide usable information
“on the deeds of the Tito fascism”. This is regularly discussed and pre-
sented in the programmes. “The Titoist speeches from the radio of Belgrade
and from the Yugoslavian press give many pieces of information on the sit-
uation of the workers and on the economic collapse.” These are regularly
mentioned in the programmes (“forced work, obligatory place of res-
idence, employment of children etc.”) and we often draw parallels
between the “increasing poverty etc. of the Yugoslav workers and the eco-
nomic growth and increasing welfare of the Soviet Union and the people’s
democracies, first of all of the Hungarian people’s democracy”.23
The eighth question concerned how the fight of the people of Yu-
goslavia against the “Tito Clique” was presented and how it helped to
strengthen the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.24 In his short answer
Szirmai wrote: “We propagate every piece of news we have on sabotage,
escape, ‘bad’ work or resistance of farmers against surrendering their pro-
duce and interpret it as the struggle of the Yugoslav people against Tito.” In
connection with news on the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, we can
only rely on the press, but there is very little about the party and so
we can only deal with it in general terms.25
The eleventh question of Rákosi was about the sources of the pro-
grammes and the staff of the editorial.26 Szirmai basically repeated
what Fenyo˝, head of the department, wrote in his the proposition from
April 13, 1950 on popularizing the Soviet Union.27
In the last, twelfth point, Rákosi asked about the success and the
shortcomings of the Serbian broadcasts.28 The answer of Szirmai was
tactful. Basically speaking, he found their work was successful. “This
is confirmed by the fact that the Hungarian Radio is under the constant attack
of the Titoist propaganda. The programmes are usually agitative, militant
and often affect emotions. It is a mistake that they do not concentrate on
the most decisive issues, which reflects a certain lack of plan or vision in the
editing.” The commentaries are not “deep enough, they do not go back to
earlier events and so, they cannot demonstrate appropriately the progress of
23 Report. May 5, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.
24 To comrade István Szirmai, Budapest. May 3, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.
25 Report. May 5, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.
26 To comrade István Szirmai, Budapest. May 3, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.
27 Report. May 5, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.
28 To comrade István Szirmai, Budapest. May 3, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.
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Tito’s treachery”. He thought it was a mistake, that the programmes
do “not use the prosperity of the Hungarian workers as an inflammatory
example”. Or, that they do not use the speeches of “Tito and his gang”
or “when the imperialists said something unintentionally”.29
Work Plan of the Hungarian Radio Corporation and the Report to
the Party
The semi-annual work plan of the Hungarian Radio Corporation was
completed by September 25, 1950. The work plan defined the most
important activities for every department for the period between Oc-
tober 1 and April 1, 1951. The general principle for the broadcasters
was that programmes need “to raise awareness for the close connection be-
tween true patriotism and international solidarity, to deepen the love of our
people for the Soviet Union and to increase the hatred for the imperialists”. In
order to achieve this, the programmes should be “harsher” and “more
militant”. “A more convincing tone” is needed, too.
Foreign language broadcasts had to follow three guidelines. The
first was a requirement to present the development and the results
of the “Hungarian people’s democracy”; the second was about “the
propagation of the Soviet Union and people’s democracies” on the one
hand and about the “unveiling of the war-plans of the imperialists and
of the betrayal of their people”; and the third was about “the agitation
materials prepared for the different countries”. The third guideline
was supplemented by the following remark: the programmes need to
tackle “internal problems of the county concerned” more intensively,
the “internal and external enemies of the people have to be identified”
and the “daily fight led by the communist party” needs to be sup-
ported. The forms of implementation: news, commentaries or articles,
interviews and reports.
Further, it was emphasized in connection with the “special” goals of
the different programmes of the Serbian and the Slovenian broadcast-
ing: efforts have to be made to “react faster to the events and to unveil
the treachery of the Tito-band in a more offensive manner, like challenging
them and making them liable on behalf of the people. Specific facts and evi-
dence has to be used to deprive the pro-Tito press and radio of the rests of their
credibility”.30
29 Report. May 5, 1950. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.
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Among the documents of the Hungarian Radio Corporation from
the period between 1945 and 1956 were only some that compare to
the report dated April 6, 1951 – A report for the Central Control Commit-
tee of the Hungarian Working People’s Party (KEB). Beyond its historical
importance, this document is significant because it was not required
from the Shortwave Department by the party, but it is the initiative of
Imréné Kenesei, deputy leader of the Yugoslavian broadcasting, and
was written for the most important forum, controlling even the lead-
ership of the party. The documents give an insight into the operations
of the Yugoslav section, the virtues and the deficiencies in its manage-
ment, the activities of the staff, the changes in the transmission times
and the propaganda of the most important foreign events.
In the introduction, Imréné Kenesei explained her reasons for writ-
ing the report: “I see certain things in our department that my comrades
need to know about. Although I reported these events case-by-case to József-
né Kovács, local party secretary and also to comrade Lajos Asztalos, leading
cadre in the personnel department – I will try to recite the most blatant ex-
amples.”
She briefly described the responsibilities of the Shortwave Depart-
ment, which included the news editing and foreign language news-
service transmitted on shortwave frequencies. There were 96 col-
leagues in the department led by Béla Fenyo˝ who did not have an
assistant. The department was divided into “sections for every for-
eign country”.
The Yugoslav section had a daily airtime of 145 minutes, 115 min-
utes regular broadcasts and “30 minutes of diktovka (dictation pro-
grammes after midnight)”. Every Sunday, the regular broadcast was
60 minutes longer.
The longest programme within the 115 minutes broadcast started at
11:00 pm and was aired on the Peto˝fi Radio until midnight. According
to the embassy in Belgrade, “Peto˝fi Radio can only be received in Slovenia
and in the North of Yugoslavia, but even there the transmission quality was
very poor. It could not be received either in Belgrade or in other parts of
Yugoslavia. This means, that on paper we demonstrate that we broadcast
a lot of agitation programmes to Yugoslavia, but most of our programmes
30 The official work plan of the Hungarian Radio Corporation. October 1, 1950–April 1,
1951. September 25, 1950. Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (hereinafter
MNL OL), XIX-I-3-n. Box No. 2.
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cannot be received. Only 65 minutes of all broadcasts on Kossuth Radio can
be received, but 30 minutes of that is diktovka. We can could add to this the
35 minutes the Slovenian broadcast on Peto˝fi Radio”.
Mrs Kenesei said that she had already reported this to Béla Fenyo˝,
head of the department, who mentioned the problem to István Szir-
mai. They agreed, that “nothing can be done. The construction of the
transmitting station in the Trans-Danubian region started several months
ago.31 Only when that is completed, can we talk about relaying the broad-
casts of Peto˝fi Radio. Nothing will change before that, only a great amount of
lost work and resources, and a false image of how and how much we agitate
against Tito”.
The next problem was the lack of control over the broadcasts in the
Serbian language. Klára Kadosa was responsible for this. The speak-
ers read out texts that had been approved, but for control purposes
there was no written second copy available. The head of the depart-
ment was repeatedly informed about this but Klára Kadosa told her
“you just sit in the studio, listen and improve yourself politically so that you
recognise the mistakes”. In reality this meant that nobody controlled the
programmes. Imréné Kenesei wrote: “the Serbian programmes had for
years been broadcasted basically with no control at all, and comrade Fenyo˝
knew very well about it. A couple of weeks ago we made some changes, but
without having agreed on it with comrade Fenyo˝”.
Then she described the character of the head of the department:
“Comrade Fenyo˝ has a very bad relationship with the reliable workers in
the department. He is arrogant and contemptuous with them and does not
care for their education. He was often criticised for this and he exercises
self-criticism in every department meeting but never really does anything
against.” During the party-groupmeeting they discussed their pledges
for the congress and the party members proposed that one of the
pledges should be that he becomes responsible for the “workers
cadre”. Fenyo˝ answered: “I have no time for this.”
The report says that the number of politically reliable workers is not
enough in the department. “It is not an explanation that there are only few
cadres who speak foreign languages, because you do not find a worker-cadre
in a position where language skills are not needed, either.” Whenever the
Personnel Department proposed a worker-journalist “from a factory
31 The transmitter in Balatonszabadi started to operate on October 24, 1953.
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newspaper”, “comrade Fenyo˝ or comrade Szirmai found out that they
are inappropriate”.
There is also a Hungarian section in the Shortwave Department.
This prepares the background material for the programmes. Accord-
ing to Mrs Kenesei, Fenyo˝ said the following about this: “The problem
is that the background materials are done people who are good communists
but bad journalists. I wish they were less good as a communist, but good as a
journalist.”
Among other mistakes of the Yugoslav section, she also wrote about
László Ko˝vágó, who “was known [. . . ] for spreading a bad spirit and con-
stantly inciting hostilities. In March, Ko˝vágó stated: ‘The skull-form of short
people is different from that of tall people. They have more developed brains.
Stocky little men are always great personalities, take Churchill, Lenin, Mus-
solini and Rákosi’”. The section decided, as Mrs Kenesei wrote, that an
“internal disciplinary proceeding has to be introduced against Ko˝vágó” for
this remark. But comrade Fenyo˝ said to the head of the Yugoslav section: ‘I
can settle this myself, why should I take it to the internal disciplinary board.
He will get a written warning from me.’ On the intervention of the party
organization and the personnel department, Ko˝vágó was removed from the
radio”.
As Mrs Kenesei wrote, Fenyo˝ did not lead the department and did
not give any “political-organizational guidance”. All his work was
just checking programmes for broadcast one by one. “This was a lot of
work to him and he used it as an excuse for not caring for the people and for
not being able to guide them. He does not build individual responsibilities,
either.”
In the next part of her report Mrs Kenesei enumerated other mis-
takes and the negligence of other sections and finally she declared:
The Shortwave Department and “within it the Yugoslav section, does not
fulfil its duty as it should. I feel that the relevant organs of the Party need to
be informed about this, and they have to know that we do not lead our fight
either against Tito or against the Western imperialists as we should. I feel
myself also responsible, that the work is not as it should be, therefore I ask the
Party for help and to examine our situation”.32
32 Copy. Central Control Committee of the Hungarian Working People’s Party, April 6,
1951. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.
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The document from June 15, 1951 enlisted the themes of the Serbian
and Slovenian broadcasts the previousmonth. Agitation in connection
with Yugoslavia had two main themes: one was about “unveiling Tito
and his band” and the other about “the mobilization of broad masses
against Tito”. The goals of the Shortwave Department concerning the
content of the programmes of the Serbian section remained unchanged
and continued to follow the instructions of the Hungarian party lead-
ership. The document enlisted accurately the themes discussed in the
broadcasts in the Serbian language and their frequency: there were
two commentaries with the title “Tito and his band is preparing as merce-
nary soldiers of America for war against the Soviet Union and [the] people’s
democracies”. An especially large number of commentaries (16) dealt
with the creation of a Balkan Alliance.33
The programmes mentioned nine times that “Tito will send Yugoslav
soldiers to Korea”. Fourteen commentaries reported that “capitalism is
being restored at an accelerated pace, while workers are misled” in Yugo-
slavia. Sixteen programmes dealt with the 1st May celebrations, the
“Tito’s relay” where the sole purpose was to hide the underlying “in-
citing chauvinism and war hysteria”. Twelve broadcasts dealt with
“Tito and the leading personalities in his band”. Nine commentaries
mentioned “the unveiling of the Titoist terror and its fascist power”.
The commentaries in the programmes continued to popularise the So-
viet Union in the usual manner and “possibly with Yugoslav refer-
ences”. Similarly, they reported on “the achievements of the Hungarian
people’s democracy: the increase of the living standard, our amended five-
years-plan etc.”. They did not extend the pool of the sources they had
used.34
Another report was made for the Agitation and Propaganda De-
partment of the Central Leadership of the MDP on 26. July 1951. This
is one of the last such reports about the department preserved in the
former Archives of the Hungarian Radio Corporation. The 23-page
long report presented and evaluated the work of all foreign language
sections. It described the duration of the programmes, the agitation
33 The Balkan Alliance was initiated by Tito and the party general secretary of Bulgaria
but Stalin stopped the ambitions of creating a regional centre that would limit his
full power.
34 The political line of agitation in Serbian and Slovenian languages. June 15, 1951.
MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.
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criteria that served as basis for the programmes and enumerated the
different forms of agitation. It described in detail the content require-
ments of the reports, commentaries and reviews. The previously pre-
sented sources were also enlisted. Deficiencies were described in great
detail, but the formulation was almost always general and the major-
ity of the points were already included in other, previously presented
documents as well. The commentaries, however, were seriously criti-
cised. Their tone “was often odourless, colourless”. Especially when
they discuss “certain issues in general terms”. The language of the
radio programmes “is not passionate enough” and the agitation not
powerful enough. “The main reason for this is, first, that we do not have
any columnists. Second, there is no political culture and knowledge of the
commented location and topic is also missing.” The nature of the Hungar-
ian broadcasts “is not Hungarian enough”. The number of comments
with Hungarian themes in these programmes is very low. “The Hun-
garian Radio Corporation does not have a well-known radio personality who
could comment the different international events on behalf of the Corporation
and explain the position of the Hungarian people.” The same also applied
the agitation in the Serbian and the Slovenian languages: this was in-
creasingly recognised as a mere repetition of ready-made clichés and
commonplaces.35
  
The character of foreign languages broadcasts were subordinated to
the political propaganda and followedwell ups and downs of the Cold
War. In 1956, after the settlement of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, dis-
appeared not only the Cominform and so its newspaper against Yu-
goslavia the “New Struggle”, but changed the tone against the West
as well.
35 Report for the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Leadership of
MDP on the work of the Shortwave Department of the Hungarian Radio Corpora-
tion, dated from July 26, 1951. MTVA KI. Box TD-317/2. 2.
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